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Abstract
This study investigates how access to political endorsements affects stated preferences for an
environmental public good in Switzerland. We developed a contingent valuation survey questionnaire
with two valuation questions, the first formulated as a (hypothetical) policy referendum, the second an
open-ended WTP question. For the referendum question we solicited endorsements from a range of
political parties and relevant interest groups. We then conducted a split-sample mail-survey experiment
in which a table listing the endorsements was included with a subsample of the questionnaires. Access
to the policy endorsements significantly affected the responses to the open-ended willingness-to-pay
question.
Resource and Energy Economics, in press 
Editor: Jason F. Shogren 
 
 
 
Anchors, Endorsements, and Preferences: 
A Field Experiment 
 
Felix Schläpfer* and Marcel Schmitt 
 
Institute of Environmental Sciences, University of Zurich, Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates how access to political endorsements affects stated preferences for an 
environmental public good in Switzerland. We developed a contingent valuation survey 
questionnaire with two valuation questions, the first formulated as a (hypothetical) policy 
referendum, the second an open-ended WTP question. For the referendum question we solicited 
endorsements from a range of political parties and relevant interest groups. We then conducted a 
split-sample mail-survey experiment in which a table listing the endorsements was included with 
a subsample of the questionnaires. Access to the policy endorsements significantly affected the 
responses to the open-ended willingness-to-pay question. 
 
JEL Classification: D70, Q26, Q28 
Keywords: Anomalies, contingent valuation, rationality, referendum, political signals 
 
 
 
* Corresponding author address: Institute of Environmental Sciences, University of Zurich, Winterthurerstrasse 190, 
8057 Zurich, Switzerland, Tel.: +41 44 635 4747, Fax: +41 44 635 5711, E-mail: schlaepf@uwinst.unizh.ch.  
The authors would like to thank several colleagues for comments on preliminary versions of the survey 
questionnaire. This paper has greatly benefited from discussion with participants of several conferences and 
seminars and from valuable comments by Jason Shogren, Nick Flores, Ian Bateman and two anonymous reviewers. 
English proofreading by Jennifer Durer is gratefully acknowledged. Financial support by the ETH Department of 
Agricultural Economics, the Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research, the Canton of Zurich 
Office for Landscape and Nature, and the Swiss Federal Office of Agriculture is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 
1. Introduction 
 
Laboratory experiments by psychologists and economists have produced a large body of 
evidence suggesting that individual preferences are inconsistent and unstable, and that the 
economic working rules may often not apply in the unfamiliar decision tasks presented in 
experimental settings. However, more recent experimental studies by economists have also 
shown that market forces can transform anomalies in preference patterns observed in the 
laboratory (e.g., Frey and Eichenberger, 1994) and that “learning” through institutions may 
promote consistent decision-making about private goods (Slembeck and Tyran, 2004). 
In choices about non-market goods and services, the power of market forces cannot be 
relied on by definition. If market settings are required for inducing individuals to make 
consistent choices, then the prospects for consistent individual decision-making about non-
market goods are bleak. Indeed, recent research on the contingent valuation of public goods has 
replicated a variety of the choice anomalies that have been observed in laboratory experiments 
which did not induce strong market-like incentives. It is currently unclear how stable and 
consistent preferences for public goods could be generated and measured in a survey setting. 
This is particularly dissatisfactory given economists’ increasing interest in nonmarket goods and 
services (McFadden 1999). 
However, political scientists have recently shown that voters in referenda use 
informational “shortcuts” to make decisions about complex issues that appear to be consistent 
with their interests and values. Specifically, they have shown that relatively uninformed voters 
who knew the positions of important interest groups were able to use this information to infer 
how a proposition would likely affect them (e.g. Lupia 1994). This finding suggests a novel 
approach to preference elicitation in surveys. Uncertain respondents in surveys may likewise 
choose – if given this option – to base their decisions on information shortcuts such as political 
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endorsements from familiar parties, which may then restore the apparent rationality of their 
decisions about unfamiliar public goods. 
In this paper we design an experiment to test if access to endorsements solicited from 
political parties and interest groups affects responses in a stated preference (contingent 
valuation) setting. We develop a survey questionnaire with two valuation questions, the first 
formulated as a (hypothetical) policy referendum, the second an open-ended WTP question. For 
the referendum question we solicit endorsements from a range of political parties and relevant 
interest groups. We then conduct a split-sample mail-survey experiment in which a table listing 
the endorsements is included with a subsample of the questionnaires. 
The rationale of this specific setup is as follows. In the control treatment without political 
endorsements, the tax costs specified in the referendum question represent an arbitrary “anchor” 
for the subsequent open-ended willingness-to-pay question. In contrast, in the treatment with 
endorsements, the tax costs together with the endorsements carry potentially important 
information which respondents may use to find their responses to both the referendum question 
and the open-ended WTP question. The experiment is therefore a test of whether replacing 
arbitrary anchors by informative signals affects stated preferences for public goods. If the answer 
is yes, then informative, non-arbitrary signals may have the potential to “crowd out” the 
undesired effects of arbitrary anchors – and thus promote consistent patterns in stated 
preferences for public goods. In addition, by experimentally varying the tax costs in the 
referendum question, it is possible to test if the effect of the information treatment is an effect of 
the presence of political endorsements per se, or if it depends on the specific proposition for 
which the endorsements are provided. 
We find that access to political endorsements in our stated preference survey setting 
strongly reduced the frequency of non-responses in the open-ended WTP question. Moreover, 
the information signals in interaction with the specified tax costs significantly affected open-
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ended WTP for the proposed policy. These findings suggest that providing access to political 
signals has the potential to reduce anomalies in stated choices about public goods. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews relevant literature and 
presents the experimental design and hypotheses. Section 3 presents the results, Section 4 
contains the discussion, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background, Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
 
Experimental psychologists have long established that individual judgements about unfamiliar 
goods and experiences are highly sensitive to framing (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968). In 
responding to experimental stimuli individuals use simplified heuristics, and their responses may 
contain largely arbitrary components (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). The arbitrary scaling of 
responses has for instance been demonstrated by the fact that initial responses are often nearly 
insensitive to the size or scope of a stimulus (Ariely et al., 2003). 
Economists have replicated many of the choice anomalies observed in psychological 
experiments (Boyle et al., 1985; Kahneman et al., 1999; McFadden, 1999). A particularly well-
examined anomaly in preference elicitation is the phenomenon of “anchoring” effects. Stated 
willingness to pay for unfamiliar goods has been found to be strongly influenced by arbitrary 
anchors such as by dollar amounts presented in dichotomous choice questions (Green et al., 
1998), or even by figures the respondents themselves had derived from their social security card 
numbers (Ariely et al., 2003). 
However, experimental economists have argued that various forms of “institutions” and 
“learning” may transform or eliminate choice anomalies. Frey and Eichenberger (1994) argue 
that the frequency of anomalous actions is endogenous and influenced by social processes. 
People may need time to learn optimal decisions (Camerer, 1995). Cherry et al. (2003) and 
Hanley and Shogren (2005) argue that that learning on private good markets may spill over to 
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choices about public goods. List (2006) reports that market settings reduced the willingness to 
pay/willingness to accept disparity even in choices about “unfamiliar” private goods. Slembeck 
and Tyran (2004) found that competition and communication among individuals – and 
specifically learning from better informed individuals – entirely eliminated choice anomalies in 
their experiment. 
Political scientists have shown that many voters in direct legislation decisions are 
uninformed to the point of ignorance about public policy, politics and government in general. 
Nevertheless, the consequences of voter ignorance continue to be debated. Kuklinksy et al. 
(1982) found that relatively uninformed voters looked to reference groups more than others in 
deciding how to vote. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1986) identify group endorsement as a 
potential source of information for imperfectly informed voters.1 Lupia (1994) argues that voters 
can use information about the preferences or opinions of others such as friends, co-workers, 
political parties or other organisations to emulate the behavior of relatively well-informed 
citizens. He corroborates his arguments with the results of an exit poll in which he surveyed 
California voters who were confronted by five complex propositions regarding the regulation of 
the insurance industry. Based on an exit poll, Lupia found that a large group of voters who 
possessed relatively low levels of factual knowledge about the initiatives but could correctly 
identify the insurance industry’s preferences on a particular proposition were much more likely 
to emulate the behavior of relatively well-informed voters on that propositions than were 
similarly uninformed voters who did not know the insurance industry’s position. Lupia and 
McCubbins (1998) discuss the dynamics of these information signals in the broader context of 
strategic models of communication known as “signalling” games (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). 
Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) observe that not all providers of information in elections are 
trustworthy or knowledgeable. However, voters have an incentive to seek advice from people 
who are credible and to avoid information from those who provide vague or unreliable advice. 
                                                 
1 See Grossman and Helpman (1999, p. 503f.) for a review of the theoretical literature on political endorsements. 
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Institutions such as truth-in-advertising laws, effective channels of communication and 
competitive political environments provide a strong incentive to publicly expose misleading 
signals.  
In the literature on stated preferences, public referenda have played an important role as a 
guide for survey design (Arrow et al., 1993; Hanemann, 1994). Problems with information 
provision and respondent uncertainty constitute a substantial part of the extensive literature 
(Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Munro and Hanley, 1999). The fact that voters in elections use 
other sources of information in addition to official voter guides has also been noted in the 
contingent valuation literature (Diamond and Hausman, 1994, p. 60; Hanemann, 1994, p. 28; 
Baron, 1996, p. 148; Shapiro and Deacon, 1996). However, although decision-makers in the 
public sector are increasingly relying on stated preference methods to provide signals of value, 
the effects of political signals on individuals’ stated preference for public goods have not been 
examined to date. The sole exception is a recent study by Schläpfer et al. (2004) who examine 
effects of political endorsements in an attribute-based choice experiment. The present study 
extends that research to a contingent valuation setting. 
 
Experimental Design 
 
In a real-world ballot proposition it would be difficult to experimentally control information 
provision. However, in an appropriately designed survey setting, access to political signals such 
as policy endorsements from diverse political parties and interest groups can be experimentally 
controlled. To experimentally isolate the effects of information shortcuts on voter behavior we 
conduct a two-stage experiment. We develop a referendum-format stated-preference survey 
questionnaire and, based on this questionnaire, solicit (negative or positive) endorsements from 
political parties and relevant interest groups. We then conduct a mail survey in which we include 
a table listing the endorsements with a subsample (one half) of the questionnaires. To allow an 
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interesting additional interpretation of the results, we orthogonally cross the information 
treatment with a treatment Green et al. (1998) used to detect “anchoring” effects in survey 
responses. 
Table 1 presents our 2×2 experimental design and provides sample sizes for each 
treatment. The first experimental factor splits the respondent sample into subsamples with and 
without access to political signals. The (orthogonal) second factor has two levels representing 
two alternative tax costs (‘bids’) specified in the first, dichotomous-choice (DC) valuation 
question which precedes a second, open-ended (OE) WTP question. In the control of the 
information treatment, this tax amount represents an arbitrary (potential) anchor for the 
responses to the OE question. In the information treatment with endorsements, these tax costs 
carry information that is potentially important for individual responses to both the DC and the 
OE question. This design allows us to examine if the responses to the survey are affected by the 
political signals, and if the specific propositions for which the signals are available (rather than 
the signals per se) matter for stated willingness to pay in an open-ended question. The interaction 
effect of the two treatment factors on stated WTP in the OE question also indicates whether the 
“anchoring effect” is transformed by informative political signals. As explained in the 
introduction, this test has an important interpretation: a significant interaction would suggest that 
informative, non-arbitrary political signals have the potential to “crowd out” anomalous effects 
of arbitrary anchors. 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
The policy proposition of the contingent valuation survey was concerned with measures 
to prevent land abandonment followed by spontaneous reforestation in the Swiss Alps.2 The 
proposition was to provide increased tax-financed incentive payments to mountain farmers who 
                                                 
2 In Switzerland, the issue of alpine agricultural land abandonment has been a subject of some debate for many 
years. In a ‘motion’ passed on March 18 2004 by the National Council and on September 29 2004 by the Council of 
States, the parliament obliged the Federal Council (the executive) to evaluate measures for preventing further land 
abandonment and forest expansion. 
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continue to manage their marginal lands and thus contribute to the public-good benefits of 
maintaining a diverse cultivated landscape. The questionnaire, in addition to a title page, 
consisted of four pages. The first page contained information about past and current land-use 
changes in the Swiss Alps, particularly with regard to the forest area and to agricultural land-use. 
This included a small map showing the percentage increase in forest area over a twelve-year 
period for each of the central, the south-western and the south-eastern region of the Alps. 
Respondents were given information about possible positive and negative consequences of a 
decline of mountain agriculture and further increase of forest area. The following page asked 
questions about general attitudes toward these changes and about the amount of time spent in the 
Swiss Alps. On the third page, the subjects were confronted with a hypothetical policy 
proposition which implied a specified increase in taxes in the case of majority approval. In a 
first, dichotomous-choice (DC) question, the respondents were asked if they would vote in favor 
of this proposition. In a second, open-ended question, they were asked to state the maximum 
amount (in SFR) at which they would vote for the proposition. This question sequence follows 
Green et al. (1998) as mentioned above. The presentation of the two valuation questions is 
illustrated in Fig. 1 of the Appendix. Compared with standard contingent valuation surveys, an 
important peculiarity of our DC question is that the cost consequence of the proposition was 
specified as a percentage increase in taxes. This specification was necessary to be able to 
subsequently collect endorsements from parties and interest groups.3 To aid the respondents in 
answering the question, a table on the same page converted the percentage amount into absolute 
amounts for different levels of the tax bill (see Appendix, Fig. 1). The questionnaire closed with 
questions about socioeconomic characteristics. The usual income question was replaced by a 
question concerning the amount of the last year’s total personal tax bill. Comprehension and 
clarity were checked with numerous policy experts and laymen, whereupon small corrections led 
to the final version of the questionnaire. 
                                                 
3 However, recent research also suggests that a bid design based on tax percentages has potential merits beyond its 
specific purpose in the present study (Boyle et al., 1997; Flores and Strong, 2004; Schläpfer, 2006). 
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In September 2004, the national offices of the largest political parties and relevant 
interest groups concerned with land-use issues were contacted and asked if they would be willing 
to provide endorsements for the land-use policy propositions. Five of the eight parties and 
interest groups we contacted agreed to participate. Their representatives jointly provided 
endorsements (Yes or No) from a broad spectrum of political interests. Based on the final 
questionnaire, these organisations gave negative or positive endorsements for both versions of 
the closed-ended valuation question (involving a 0.2 and a 1.0 percent tax increase). 
Endorsements were obtained from the following organisations: People’s Party (SVP, right-
wing), Liberal Democrats (FDP, center), Swiss Farmers Union, Swiss Foundation for 
Consumerism (largest consumer organisation), and Pro Natura (largest NGO in Swiss nature 
conservation). For each of the two bid-levels a sheet with the endorsements was then printed to 
be included as a supplement to the questionnaires (Appendix, Fig. 2). The consumer organisation 
switched from a positive to a negative endorsement when the tax costs were 1 instead of 0.2 tax 
percent. The other organisations gave the same recommendation for both ‘bid’ levels. 
For the mail survey we used the (complete) address stock from a previous mail survey on 
land-use policy in the Canton of Zurich conducted in November/December 2003 (Schläpfer et 
al., 2004). Potential respondents had been recruited by telephone from five municipalities in the 
Canton of Zurich (Zurich, Faellanden, Greifensee, Grueningen and Baeretswil).4 The 
questionnaires were sent out in October 2004, and a reminder was sent to all addresses about 
three weeks after the initial mailing. The mail-survey mode is cognitively the most similar to 
Swiss ballot decisions in that most voters receive their ballot materials and most post their votes 
by mail rather than passing by the ballot boxes in person. 
                                                 
4 The target individuals were selected in a two-stage process to obtain a sample that corresponded well with the 
structure of the sampled population. First, random samples were drawn from the list of telephone numbers in the 
survey areas. The household structure was then surveyed, yielding number, age, and gender of all potential 
respondents in the household (citizens with the right to vote). A random sample of individuals was then drawn from 
the potential target members of the households. Households were contacted five times (on different days) before 
target respondents were replaced. A computer-assisted algorithm for selecting replacements ensured that the age and 
sex distribution in the sample remained close to census distributions. 
9 
 Hypotheses 
 
The experimental design allows us to test a number of specific hypotheses regarding the effect of 
the political signals on the survey responses. First, we examine if the information shortcuts 
affected the questionnaire return rates (hypothesis H1). Second, we test if the information 
shortcuts affect the (unconditional) distribution of the responses among the categories “yes”, 
“no” and “missing” in the DC question, and among the categories “positive”, “zero”, “slash” (/) 
and “missing” in the OE question (H2). Third, we use multiple regression to examine how the 
information treatment and the ‘bid’ level (coded as dummy variables) affect the probability of a 
Yes response in the DC question and stated WTP value in the OE question. In a model with the 
pooled data, we thus test if the coefficients on the treatment dummies (and their interaction) are 
significantly different from zero (H3). 
 
3. Experimental Results 
 
Of the 773 distributed questionnaires 311 (40.2%) were returned complete. The return rate was 
not different among the four treatment combinations (see Table 1).  
Table 2 presents the frequency of Yes, No and missing responses to the dichotomous-
choice valuation question. In the low-bid treatment (Bid=0.2), the frequency of Yes, No and 
missing responses was very similar with and without political signals. In the high-bid treatment 
(Bid=1.0), the signals tended to increase the proportion of Yes votes (49 vs. 36 percent) while the 
proportion of No votes and missings tended to be decreased. However, this result was not 
statistically significant in chi-square independence tests. 
 
- Table 2 about here - 
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  Table 3 presents the frequency of the response categories in to the OE question. Under 
the low-bid treatment, the endorsements did not significantly affect the frequency of responses in 
the four categories. Under the high-bid treatment, the frequency of the responses among the four 
categories was different between the split samples with and without endorsements. Specifically, 
the frequency of missings (or item non-response) was significantly lower when the respondents 
had access to the signals (14 percent vs. 33 percent of the responses), while the frequency of zero 
bids was increased. When bid-level subsamples were pooled, the proportion of missing values 
was again significantly reduced by the endorsements. Means and standard deviations of the 
“usable” WTP responses to the open-ended question (following the interpretation described 
below) are presented in Table 4. In moving from the DC to the OE question, 7.4 percent of the 
DC and OE responses were inconsistent. Fifteen No voters stated a WTP greater than their bid 
amount, and eight Yes voters stated a WTP smaller than their bid amount. As this type of 
inconsistency cannot be identified in standard surveys we did not exclude these observations 
from the sample. 
 
- Tables 3 and 4 about here - 
 
To analyze the responses to the valuation questions in a multiple regression framework, 
we coded dummy variables for each of the two-level treatment factors. The definitions of the 
explanatory variables in the regressions are presented in Table 5. To analyze the responses to the 
OE question we divided the open-ended WTP amount by the self-reported annual tax bill to 
obtain the variable “WTP in tax percent”. Incredibly high WTP bids, defined as WTP greater 
than 10 percent of the annual tax bill, were excluded from the analysis. There were eight such 
responses, three from respondents with access to the endorsements and five from respondents 
without access to the endorsements. The “slash” (/) and missing responses were interpreted as 
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zero bids. This interpretation seems to be the most appropriate one on the following grounds. 
“Slash” was observed only once among those voting Yes and 31 times among those voting No in 
the DC question. Blanks were observed 7 times among those voting Yes and 36 times among 
those voting No. Given less frequent “missings” (and more frequent zeros) under the SIGNALS 
treatment, deleting these responses could seriously bias our estimates. (We also ran the models 
with “slash” and blanks coded as “missing” for the Yes voters and as “zero” for the No voters; 
this did not change our results.)  
 
- Table 5 about here - 
 
Table 6 contains the estimates from regressions of the binary responses to the DC 
question (probit models) and the OE question (OLS and censored “Tobit” regression) on the 
treatment dummies, with and without relevant (significant) socioeconomic co-variables. These 
models encompass direct tests of our hypotheses regarding the impact of the endorsements on 
the DC and OE responses. The binary (Yes/No) choices were not significantly affected by the 
treatments (Table 6, column 1). This result did not change when dummies for gender and high 
income were added to the model (column 4), although BID × SIGNALS tended to have a 
positive effect (t=1.46). In the OLS and Tobit models of percentage WTP with only the treatment 
dummies included as independent variables (Table 6, columns 2 and 3), BID and SIGNALS had 
a significant interactive effect on the open-ended WTP responses (columns 2 and 3). This pattern 
remained unchanged when dummies for gender and high income were added to the model 
(columns 5 and 6), or when the absolute WTP (instead of the percentage WTP) was used as the 
dependent variable. 
 
- Table 6 about here - 
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The effects of BID on the OE responses are effects of “bid-anchoring” as discussed for 
example in Green et al. (1998). An important interpretation of the significant interaction between 
BID and SIGNALS is that this anchoring effect is changed or transformed by the political 
signals. However, there is an important difference in the interpretation of the BID effect in our 
two information treatments. In the treatment without access to political signals, the effect of BID 
is the effect of an arbitrary anchor on the responses to the OE question. In the treatment with 
information signals, in contrast, the effect of BID is the effect of informative signals or, in other 
words, of an informative, non-arbitrary anchor.  
Regarding the socioeconomic characteristics, male respondents were significantly less 
likely to “vote” Yes in the DC question. The annual taxbill (Highinc) had a negative effect on 
open-ended WTP. In interpreting this result, it is important to consider that the ‘bid’ in the DC 
question was presented as a percentage change in existing (progressive) taxes. The coefficient on 
the income dummy was positive as expected when we used the absolute WTP (instead of the 
percentage WTP) as the dependent variable, (OLS t=2.79, p<0.01; Tobit t=1.37).  
The results of the hypothesis tests are summarized in Table 7. 
 
- Table 7 about here - 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Several aspects of the results and the experimental approach in general warrant further 
discussion. 
The effects of the political signals on the open-ended WTP responses support the 
hypothesis and observational findings of political scientists that voters who are confronted with 
unfamiliar policy propositions may choose to base their decisions on endorsements received 
from political parties and interest groups. The substantial reduction of item non-reponse suggests 
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that the endorsements reduced information costs and that at least some of the respondents 
perceived them as helpful for formulating a “satisfactory” response. 
The mean effect of political endorsements on open-ended WTP was positive (see Table 
4). We suggest that this direction of the effect can be partly explained by an asymmetry of the 
“decision space” in the open-ended question: subjects with a generally positive perception of 
public spending for landscape management may have been reassured by positive endorsements 
from favored organisations. Their WTP was therefore increased by the endorsements. Subjects 
with a generally negative perception of the broader policy issue may have been similarly 
reassured by the (negative) endorsements from their favored organisations. However, since the 
range of possible WTP responses had a natural lower bound of zero, the positive effects on the 
mean WTP of the “proponents” may have been stronger than the negative effects on the mean 
WTP of the “opponents”. The many zero WTP responses given by those who answered No to the 
DC question (see above) lend some support to this interpretation. 
In the treatment without endorsement information we found a larger proportion of Yes 
responses to the tax increase of 0.2 percent than to the tax increase of 1 percent as expected (0.47 
vs. 0.36; see Table 2), but this difference was not significant in the test (Table 6). While 
insensitivity to the bid level is often seen as evidence of a flawed study, such interpretations must 
clearly take the specific bid design into account. The bid levels in the present study varied by a 
factor of five while CV studies on tax-financed public goods often use experimental designs that 
vary the bid by a factor of one hundred or more. It is clear that designs which unlike our design 
include extremely high bids (relative to the income of the respondent) will be more likely to 
produce significant effects of the bid level. In the treatment with endorsements, the proportion of 
Yes responses was slightly smaller with the smaller tax increase than with the larger tax increase 
(0.43 vs. 0.49; non-significant). This finding suggests that, within the range of tax increases used, 
the endorsements may not have helped the respondents in formulating rational responses to the 
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DC question. However, it seems fair to say that the effect of the tax increase would likely be 
different with tax increases varying by a factor of one hundred – and related party information.5  
Using tax percentages is a precondition for the parties to be able to provide endorsements 
for a tax-financed public good (see section Experimental design). Valuation in a rational model 
then somehow involves the translation of tax percentages (or changes in a public budget) into 
personal tax consequences. The conversion table provided in the valuation question had precisely 
the purpose of guiding the respondent in this inevitable task. We thus used absolute amounts in 
the open-ended question only after introducing the respondent to the correspondence between 
percentages and individual-specific amounts. Once the respondent is aware of this 
correspondence, a WTP in absolute amounts may be easier to formulate than a WTP in tax 
percentages. However, we do not want to suggest that this was the best way to proceed. 
Exploring alternative procedures would seem to be an important topic for future research. 
The specification of the costs as a percentage (rather than absolute) increase in taxes may 
have far-reaching consequences for the credibility and strategic incentives of stated preference 
questions (Flores and Strong, in press; Schläpfer, 2006; Schläpfer and Hanley, 2006). By this 
formulation we essentially prevented that the public good was offered to high (low) incomes at 
incredibly low (high) costs. This sets the control of our information treatment clearly apart from 
standard contingent valuation formats. The observed effects of the information treatment may 
thus not be generalized to surveys using a standard ‘bid’ design. 
Our results are relevant for future research on stated preferences for public goods. The 
reduced frequency of non-responses under the treatment with endorsements suggests that this 
information treatment may reduce problems with respondent uncertainty in notoriously difficult 
                                                 
5 One reviewer suggested an interesting alternative interpretation of the insignificant bid amount: “You change taxes 
and you change the good. For this reason demand as opposed to willingness to pay is being measured. A higher 
proportional tax rate increase may be preferred over a lower if it is closer to my bliss point (individually preferred 
tax increase). […] If the exact number of acres covered was the same across the two bid amounts, then I would say 
willingness to pay is being measured. If instead the acres covered is not explicit, I would have to infer that higher 
taxes means more acres.” This interpretation seems plausible, but we would suggest that a similar interpretation 
might also apply to standard question formats where the bid is specified as an absolute dollar amount. 
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decisions and may hence reduce well-known empirical symptoms of respondent uncertainty such 
as insensitivity to scope, part-whole bias, and anchoring effects. The significant interaction of the 
information and ‘bid’ level treatments specifically suggests that political endorsements in a 
survey setting have the potential to “crowd out” anomalous anchoring effects by replacing 
arbitrary anchors with informative political signals. 
Regarding the applied use of contingent valuation for benefit-cost analysis, our 
experiment demonstrates that it is possible to conduct field surveys in which respondents have 
access to a similar type of political signals as voters have in direct legislation decisions. To those 
policy-makers who seek information about individuals’ preferences for public goods, the 
endorsements themselves and their effect on survey responses may provide valuable additional 
information about the likely preferences and support for proposed policies outside the restrictive 
information environment of standard stated preference approaches. Our approach thus holds 
considerable promise for applied research in nonmarket valuation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Compared to exit polls, laboratory experiments and standard contingent valuation surveys, our 
contingent valuation approach with political endorsements combines the advantages of a 
controlled experimental setting with a social context and information environment that is similar 
to real-world voting decisions. The main results of our experiment are that (i) the open-ended 
WTP responses were more strongly affected by the political signals than the dichotomous choice 
responses, (ii) the endorsements reduced the frequency of item non-response in the open-ended 
question, and (iii) the responses were more strongly affected by the endorsements when the 
(hypothetical) cost of the proposition was relatively high than when it was low. 
 Some may argue that the stated preferences we elicit at best mimic, rather than reveal, 
“true” preferences. We agree. However, as Ariely et al. (2003) demonstrate, even choices about 
16 
private goods may often be “anchored” in prices and other signals from competitive markets. 
Seen in this light, the best we can do in preference elicitation is to ensure that the respondents 
have access to informative rather than misleading anchors. If we achieve this by providing 
endorsements from reputable, accountable political actors, then survey responses about public 
goods may be as firmly grounded in “true” preferences as many of our routine choices about 
private goods in the markets. 
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Table 1. Experimental Design 
 Signals Control 
Bid = 0.2 193 (78) 194 (81) 
Bid = 1.0 193 (78) 193 (74) 
Note: Entries are numbers of distributed (and returned) questionnaires. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Test Results for Split Sample Comparison of DC responses 
Frequency of response types 
(proportions) 
Sample Treatment 
split samples 
tested (n) Yes No Missing 
χ2 statistic, df=2 
Bid = 0.2 SIGNALS 32 (0.43) 33 (0.45) 9 (0.12) 0.32 
 CONTROL 38 (0.47) 35 (0.43) 8 (0.10)  
Bid = 1.0 SIGNALS 38 (0.49) 30 (0.39) 10 (0.13) 2.90 
 CONTROL 28 (0.36) 35 (0.45) 15 (0.19)  
Pooled SIGNALS 70 (0.46) 63 (0.41) 19 (0.13) 0.71 
 CONTROL 66 (0.42) 70 (0.44) 23 (0.15)  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, Test Results for Split Sample Comparison of Responses to the 
Open-ended Question 
Frequency of response types (proportion) Sample Treatment 
split samples 
tested (n) 
positive zero slash (/) missing 
(blank) 
χ2 
statistic, 
df=3 
χ2 statistic, 
df=1 
(missing 
vs. other) 
SIGNALS 39 (0.53) 13 (0.18) 9 (0.13) 13 (0.18) 1.97 0.02 Bid = 0.2 
CONTROL 47 (0.58) 8 (0.10) 11 (0.14) 15 (0.19)   
SIGNALS 47 (0.60) 9 (0.12) 11 (0.14) 11 (0.14) 8.43 ** 7.97*** Bid = 1 
 CONTROL 36 (0.46) 9 (0.12) 7 (0.09) 26 (0.33)   
Pooled SIGNALS 86 (0.57) 22 (0.14) 20 (0.13) 24 (0.16) 5.091 4.70 ** 
 CONTROL 83 (0.52) 17 (0.11) 18 (0.11) 41 (0.26)   
Note: *,**,*** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of the WTP Responses to the Open-ended 
Question 
Sample  WTP absolute WTP in tax percentages 
  Mean SE N Mean SE N 
Bid=1 SIGNALS 121.0 38.1 76  1.40 0.26 71 
 CONTROL 47.4 9.7 77  0.76 0.14 72 
Bid=0.2 SIGNALS 27.9 8.1 73  0.47 0.10 63 
 CONTROL 26.1 4.3 77  0.56 0.17 67 
Note: SE indicates standard errors. 
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Table 5. Definition of the Independent Variables 
Variable name Description Coding Mean SD N 
BID Tax costs in the DC 
question (percent of tax 
bill) 
1 if “1 percent”; 0 if 
“0.2 percent” 
0.502 0.501 311 
SIGNALS Access to the political 
signals 
1 if access; 0 if no 
access 
0.489 0.501 311 
Highinc Annual taxbill (CHF) 1 if > 10’000; 0 
otherwise 
0.537 0.499 311 
Male Gender 1 if male; 0 if 
female 
0.518 0.500 281 
Note: SD indicates the standard deviation. 
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Table 6. Regression Model Results for the Pooled Samples 
Variable Probit OLS Tobit Probit OLS Tobit 
Constant 0.04 0.56*** -0.16 0.41** 1.06*** 0.67* 
 (0.24) (3.07 (-0.52) (1.97) (4.68) (1.84) 
Highinc    0.02 -0.66*** -0.99***
    (0.13) (-3.62) (-3.36) 
Male    -0.49*** -0.17 -0.39 
    (-2.91) (-0.96) (-1.33) 
BID -0.20 0.20 -0.08 -0.30 0.18 -0.10 
 (-0.90) (0.78) (-0.18) (-1.29) (0.71) (-0.24) 
SIGNALS -0.07 -0.09 -0.23 -0.10 -0.15 -0.34 
 (-0.35) (-0.34) (-0.54) (-0.42) (-0.57) (-0.81) 
BID × SIGNALS 0.35 0.73** 1.26** 0.49 0.71** 1.24** 
 (1.13) (2.00) (2.11) (1.46) (1.98) (2.13) 
SIGMA   2.25***   2.17*** 
   (16.30)   (16.31) 
N 262 273 273 234 272 272 
Log-likelihood -180.8  -423.90 -155.8  -415.09 
Log-l. restricted -181.6  -504.04 -161.8  -502.54 
R2  0.056   0.107  
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; for significance levels see Table 3. 
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Table 7. Summary of Results 
Null-Hypothesis Result 
H10: Endorsements do not affect survey response rates not rejected 
H2.10: Endorsements do not affect response categories to DC 
question (χ2 frequency test) 
not rejected 
H2.20: Endorsements do not affect response categories to OE 
question (χ2 frequency test) 
rejected for subsample with 
bid=1 and for pooled sample 
H3.10: Endorsements do not affect responses to DC question 
(test of restrictions in Probit model) 
not rejected 
H3.20: Endorsements do not affect responses to OE question 
(test of restrictions in OLS and Tobit models) 
rejected; significant interactive 
effect (with BID) 
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 Figure legends 
 
Fig. 1  Wording and presentation of the valuation questions (translated from German). 
 
Fig. 2 Wording and presentation of the endorsements for the question involving a 1 
percent increase in taxes (translated from German). 
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 Question 4 
 
Imagine the following national ballot proposition:  
 
Through a targeted increase of compensation payments to farmers, 
the continued agricultural use of the current meadows and 
pastures in the mountainous regions will be secured. With this 
measure, a further forest expansion will be stopped. The 
payments will be financed through taxes: In consequence, your 
annual tax bill (municipal, cantonal and direct federal taxes) 
increases by 0.2 percent. The table below helps you estimate to 
how many Francs the [...] percent tax increase corresponds for 
you personally. 
 
 
Annual 
taxbill 
in Francs 
A [...] percent tax 
increase corresponds 
to ….. Francs 
per year 
 
0 0  
2’000 4  
4’000 8  
*Note: 
If as a married couple 
you receive a common tax 
bill, please divide the 
amount of your tax bill 
by two. 
6’000 12  
8’000 16  
10’000 20  
15’000 30  
20’000 40  
 
 
 
Would you approve of this proposition? 
 
F Yes, I would approve of the proposition 
F No, I would reject the proposition 
F don’t know 
 
[Are you unsure, if you would or would not approve of the 
proposition? Enclosed you find choice recommendations from 
various political parties and interest groups. You may use these 
recommendations, as the voting recommendations in ballot 
propositions, to form your opinion.] 
 
 
Question 5 
 
By how much could your tax bill be maximally increased, so that 
you would just approve of the proposition? 
 
 ca.  ....................  Francs per year (for married 
couples: amount per person)  
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 Choice recommendations for Question 4 (enclosure to the 
questionnaire) 
 
The representatives of the listed political parties and interest 
groups recommend you the following responses to question 4: 
 
Yes,  
Approval of the 
proposition 
  
No,  
Rejection of the 
proposition 
 
BAUERNVERBAND 
 
 
Note: 
 
These choice recommendations do not necessarily correspond to the official 
party or interest group position. The answers are those of individual members 
who have done their best to state the position of their party or interest 
group: 
 
Bauernverband: Marco Baltensweiler (Director Division Agricultural 
Economics) 
Pro Natura: Ueli Berchtold (Project manager Protected areas, 
Division Biotopes and species) 
Stiftung für  
Konsumentenschutz: Jacqueline Bachmann (Director) 
SVP: Jeannine Grünenfelder (Scientific Advisor) 
FDP: Romain Clivaz (Policy Secretary) 
 
30 
